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Abstract 
 
Understanding how corporate owners respond to dividend taxation is essential in order to minimize the excess 
burden caused by it. Dividend taxes reduce the return on investment and may, therefore, distort savings and 
investment in the economy. Moreover, following the basic setting of a consumer's maximization problem, dividend 
taxation restricts the consumption funded with dividend, and therefore, may reduce the owner’s willingness to put 
effort on the firm. However, the empirical evidence of such real responses is somewhat controversial. In this study, I 
use comprehensive Finnish data on Finnish corporations’ main owners to pursue the existing literature and to 
provide empirical evidence from Finland.  
 
In the analysis, I observe years 2000-2013 and three different dividend tax schedules in use. The data include more 
than 600,000 observations during the research period. I quantify the intensity of the responses to dividend taxation 
with the elasticity of taxable income (dividend tax elasticity). The elasticity of taxable income is a key parameter in 
the efficiency analysis of income taxation. It indicates how much income subject to taxation changes as the net-of-
tax rate changes; therefore, it captures most responses to taxation including reduced production, distorted 
investment decision and tax planning. The majority of the earlier empirical literature has used the Difference-in-
Differences (DD) method and a change in the tax rate to estimate the elasticity. However, the recently developed 
bunching method has several benefits relative to the DD, including fewer assumptions required. The bunching 
method uses discontinuities in the dividend tax schedule to estimate the dividend tax elasticity. In Finland, the 
marginal tax rate on dividends increased from 26 % to 40.5 % at a dividend income level of €90,000 in 2006–2011. 
These kinds of tiers in the marginal tax rates are likely to induce bunching which can be used to estimate the 
elasticity of taxable income.  
 
By using discontinuities in the dividend tax schedule as a source of variation, I find exceptionally clear dividend 
responses to the increase in a marginal dividend tax rate. The bunching evidence is substantial, and the estimated 
dividend tax elasticity is approximately 0.5. Furthermore, I study investment responses induced by dividend taxes by 
exploiting reforms in the dividend tax schedule. While I show that dividend payments respond strongly to dividend 
taxation, my descriptive analysis of real responses does not suggest that firms facing a dividend tax increase 
decrease their real investments in the short run. In fact, the descriptive results suggest that most of the responses 
are related to tax planning such as income-shifting.  
 
This topic has not been studied empirically in Finland before. My thesis provides a credible estimate of dividend tax 
elasticity in Finland. The elasticity of taxable income is a key parameter in evaluating tax policy, as it helps policy 
planners to estimate the effect a tax cut or an increase may induce. However, the elasticity of taxable income is a 
function of the tax base and income shifting possibilities and incentives (such as differences among tax bases) 
among others. Thus, the broadness of the tax base and income shifting incentives need to be taken into account 
when planning reforms.  In addition to the dividend tax elasticity estimate, this thesis provides further description of 
the behavioral responses and the Finnish income tax system. My descriptive results indicate that, in the short term, 
Finnish corporate owners are mainly responsive to dividend taxation through tax planning rather than through 
investment decisions. Thus, dividend income tax reforms motivated solely with short term investment growth effects 
should be treated with caution. 
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Osinkoverotusta suunniteltaessa on tärkeää ymmärtää, kuinka voimakkaasti ja miten yrityksen ja niiden omistajat 
reagoivat verotukseen. Kansainvälinen tutkimuskirjallisuus on osoittanut, että yrittäjät reagoivat palkansaajia 
voimakkaammin tuloverotukseen. Sekä teoreettinen että empiirinen tutkimus on kuitenkin ristiriitaista sen osalta, 
vaikuttaako osinkoverotus yritysten investointipäätöksiin vai heijastuuko se omistajien päätöksiin lähinnä 
verosuunnittelun muodossa. Tässä tutkielmassa tutkin osinkoverotuksen vaikutuksia listaamattomien yritysten ja 
niiden pääomistajien päätöksiin suomalaisessa järjestelmässä.  
 
Mittaan yrittäjien herkkyyttä reagoida osinkoverotukseen verotettavan tulon joustolla. Verotettavan tulon jousto 
mittaa, kuinka verotettava tulo muuttuu, kun veron jälkeen käteen jäävä osuus tulosta muuttuu. Joustoon kiteytyy 
valtaosa verotuksen vaikutuksista, kuten veronkierto, tulonmuunto, vähentynyt tuotanto ja vääristyneet 
investointipäätökset. Hyödynnän aineistoa vuosilta 2000–2013, jolloin käytössä on ollut kolme eri 
osinkoveroasteikkoa. Havaintoja aineistossa on yli 600 000. Vuodesta 2005 alkaen (pääomatulo-) osinkojen 
rajaveroasteikossa on ollut porras, esimerkiksi vuosina 2006–2011 rajaveroaste nousi 26 prosentista 40,5 prosentiin 
90 000 euroa ylittävistä osingoista. Pääomistajilla on taipumusta kasautua tällaisille kynnyksille. Käyttämäni 
uudehko bunching-menetelmä hyödyntää veroasteikon epäjatkuvuuksien aiheuttamaa kasautumista verotettavan 
tulon jouston laskemiseksi. Valtaosa aiemmasta empiirisestä kirjallisuudesta hyödyntää veromuutosta ja DD-
menetelmää verotettavan tulon jouston laskemiseksi. Bunching-menetelmällä on kuitenkin useita vahvuuksia DD-
menetelmään verrattuna, liittyen muun muassa vaadittuihin oletuksiin. 
 
Tulokseni osoittavat, että omistajat kasautuvat poikkeuksellisen selvästi kynnyksille rajaveroasteikossa. 
Verotettavan tulon jousto on noin 0,5. Lisäksi tutkin osinkoverotuksen reaalisia vaikutuksia tarkastelemalla 
osinkoverouudistusten vaikutuksia yritysten reaali-investointipäätöksiin. Vaikka osingonmaksu reagoi voimakkaasti 
osinkoverotukseen, kuvailevassa analyysissä ei ilmene lyhyen aikavälin reaalisia vaikutuksia yritysten 
investointeihin. Sitä vastoin analyysini osoittaa, että valtaosa reaktioista on verosuunnittelua erityisesti 
tulonmuunnon kautta (tulojen siirtäminen osinkotulosta palkkatuloksi). 
 
Aihetta ei ole aiemmin tutkittu kattavasti suomalaisella aineistolla. Tutkielmani tarjoaa uskottavan verotettavan 
osinkotulon joustoestimaatin Suomessa. Estimaatti antaa työkalun osinkoveromuutosten vaikutusten tarkasteluun. 
On kuitenkin huomioitava, että mikäli osa verotettavan tulon vähenemisestä osinkotulossa siirtyy esimerkiksi 
palkkatuloon, ei osinkotulon jousto kerro muutoksista kokonaisverokertymässä. Jouston estimoimisen lisäksi 
analysoin osinkoverotuksen vaikutuksia omistajien investointipäätöksiin. Tulokseni tukevat kirjallisuuden uutta 
näkemystä, jonka mukaan osinkoverotuksella ei ole huomattavia vaikutuksia yritysten investointeihin. Siksi 
osinkoveromuutosten perustelemiseen lyhyen aikavälin investointi- ja kasvuvaikutuksilla tulee suhtautua 
varauksella. 
Avainsanat   
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1 Introduction
Understanding how corporate owners respond to dividend taxation is essential in order
to minimize the excess burden caused by it. Taxing dividends is fundamental to public
ﬁnance for two reasons. First, a good tax system has a broad base (Saez et al., 2012), so
dividends probably should be taxed. Second, dividend income accumulates to the top
of income distribution (Piketty et al., 2014), so dividend taxation is usually considered
desirable due to re-distributive reasons. However, dividend taxation creates a notable
equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ. Dividend taxes reduce the return on investment and there-
fore may distort savings and investment in the economy. In addition, dividend taxation
may induce ﬁrms to retain earnings instead of distributing proﬁts. Should this lead to
ineﬃcient utilization of the retained earnings, dividend taxation reduces the eﬃciency
of capital allocation. Moreover, corporate owners respond strongly to taxation not just
by distorted investment but by tax planning and tax evasion, as the recent leak of the
so-called Panama papers has further revealed (Bilton, 2016). Due to these eﬀects, many
developed countries have reformed their dividend taxation during the last decade or so,
making responses induced by dividend taxation a very timely topic (OECD, 2011).
There is a vast amount of theoretical literature on dividend taxation, starting from Feld-
stein (1970). However, the empirical evidence is somewhat controversial. Traditional
theoretical literature suggests that dividend taxation causes signiﬁcant real responses
through the cost of corporate investment (Feldstein, 1970; Poterba & Summers, 1985).
Later research, starting from King (1974) and Auerbach (1979), has concluded that the
marginal corporate investment is mainly ﬁnanced by retained earnings, thus reducing
the signiﬁcance of dividend taxation on corporate investment.
Empirical literature is mixed in its results (see e.g. Alstadsæter et al. 2015 and Yagan
2015). In addition to distortions in investment behavior, dividend taxation may induce
responses such as income shifting (see e.g. Harju & Matikka 2016) and tax evasion (see
e.g. Kleven et al. 2011). Papers with Finnish data, studying the dual income tax reform
of 1993 (Pirttilä & Selin, 2011) and a reform of 2005 (Harju & Matikka, 2016), suggest
that income-shifting between tax bases (capital income and wage) accounts for the
majority of the responses. Kari et al. (2008) note that as the reform of 2005 was known
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in advance, the owners increased their dividend payouts signiﬁcantly in anticipation of
the reform.
The elasticity of taxable income (ETI) is a key parameter in the eﬃciency analysis of
income taxation. It quantiﬁes the behavioral responses to taxation. ETI indicates how
much income subject to taxation changes as the tax rate changes. In the absence of
externalities and putting aside income eﬀects, all responses to taxation are sources of
ineﬃciency. This ineﬃciency includes responses such as reduced production, distorted
investment decisions or a diﬀerent form of business organization. The ETI captures all
of these. In dividend context the ETI is often referred to as dividend tax elasticity.
Yagan (2015) and Chetty & Saez (2005) exploit the 2003 dividend tax reform in the
US and obtain signiﬁcant responses to dividend taxation. The dividend tax elasticity
estimates in both studies are approximately 0.5. However, dividend tax elasticity is
not a suﬃcient method for quantifying the loss of tax revenue, since revenue may be
collected in another tax base (Saez et al., 2012). Nonetheless, it is an excellent way
to quantify how much corporate owners respond to dividend taxation by adjusting
dividend payments.
In this paper, I use the discontinuities in the Finnish dividend tax schedule to estimate
dividend tax elasticity. The Finnish dividend tax schedule provides exceptionally large
incentives for ﬁrms to adjust their dividend payments as the tax schedule features
distinctive discontinuities in marginal tax rates. For example, the marginal tax rate
on dividends increases from 26 % to 40.5 % at a dividend income level of ¿90,000 in
20062011. By using such discontinuities in the dividend tax schedule as a source of
variation, I follow the recently developed so-called bunching method to estimate the
dividend tax elasticity at the threshold.1 I use extensive individual-level panel data
on all Finnish privately-held corporations and their main owners. The new method
together with the comprehensive panel data provide a solid base for the estimation.
I ﬁnd substantial dividend responses to the increase in marginal tax rate. The bunching
evidence is exceptionally large: excess mass at the kink is 10 times the counterfactual
mass and very exact. The corresponding dividend tax elasticity is approximately 0.5.
1The bunching method is introduced by Saez (2010), Kleven (2016) provides an excellent review of
the method and the related literature.
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Moreover, the persistence of bunching at the kink is notable compared to the surround-
ing dividend amounts. In addition, I examine some supplementary features of the
corporations to identify more characteristics of the ﬁrms that respond to the kink, such
as the industry, net assets and the size of the ﬁrm and the wage of the owner. Finally,
I provide graphical analysis of the responses to ﬁnd out the extent of real versus tax
planning responses induced by dividend taxation. I am unable to trace any clear real
responses; it appears that the responses mainly consist of income shifting.
My thesis contributes to earlier literature in many aspects. First, it contributes to
the earlier tax elasticity literature by providing a new elasticity estimate by using the
bunching method. To the best of my knowledge, I am the ﬁrst to use the bunching
method to estimate the dividend tax elasticity. Second, it pursues work on the impact
of dividend tax policies to company behavior. Third, it extends research on the Finnish
income tax system and its behavioral eﬀects.
In chapter 2, I review earlier literature related to dividend taxation and elasticities of
taxable income. In chapter 3, I outline the Finnish dividend tax schedule and its recent
reforms. The Finnish data are described in chapter 4 and the method is introduced in
chapter 5. In chapter 6, I present the results. Chapter 7 draws the conclusions.
3
2 Literature Review
2.1 Empirical Literature on Tax Elasticities
Before outlining earlier research on dividend taxation, I review the literature on tax
elasticities in general. Estimates from other income tax bases provide useful information
about responses to taxation and enable comparison among income forms. Table 1
summarizes earlier elasticity estimates from the empirical tax literature. Table 1 should
be read with caution as methodological issues are a problem especially with the early
tax elasticity estimates. Even though the elasticity of taxable income as a concept is
unambiguous, estimating it poses a challenge. It is possible that some models fail to
assess exogenous income trends, mean reversion and other issues comprehensively.
Feldstein (1995) triggered the interest in empirical ETI analysis using panel data. In
a later paper, Feldstein (1999) shows how the dead weight loss of taxation can be
computed by using the elasticity of taxable income.2 By studying the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, Feldstein (1995) generates large ETI estimates for top earners ranging from
1.04 to 3.05 with diﬀerent speciﬁcations. The tax decrease concerned the highest income
group. Thus, he uses the top 1 % earners as a treatment group and the following income
groups as a control group. Feldstein's results are consistent with similar relatively high
estimates obtained by Lindsey (1987) with cross sectional data on 1981 tax change.
There are several challenges to Feldstein's pioneering method, and the paper has later
faced criticism. Therefore, it provides a good example of challenges faced in empirical
ETI literature. One of the problems is that the method is very sensitive to the selection
of a control group (Saez et al., 2012). Moreover, the assumption of a common trend,
necessary when identiﬁcation is based on diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences, may be violated if
there are changes in income inequality, i.e. there is higher or lower income growth
in the treatment group than in the control group. An issue concerning especially the
top income groups is mean reversion: The top 1 percent incomes in the base year t0
are likely to decrease since many of the individuals in the top 1 percent had large
2The dead weight loss equals DWL = 0.5τ2(1− τ)−1e TI, where τ indicates the tax rate, e is the
elasticity of taxable income and TI is taxable income. (Feldstein, 1999)
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positive transitory incomes. (Saez et al., 2012) Mean reversion may be the cause for
sensitivity to the control group choice. It is evident that the high income tax payers
whose marginal income tax rate dropped during the 1980s increased their income during
the era. However, the 1980s was a decade of growth, widening international trade and
skill-biased technical change. Therefore, it is a challenge to assess the role of taxation in
the widening of the income distribution. In addition, panel regressions are very sensitive
to the choice of the instrument for the marginal tax rate, as noted by Saez et al. (2012).
Feldstein (1995) uses income percentile. Auten & Carroll (1999) and Gruber & Saez
(2002) use the estimated change in net-of-tax rate as an instrument, assuming each tax
ﬁler's income grows at the rate of overall nominal income growth between the base and
subsequent year.
Another challenge in early papers have been the quality and coverage of the data. Early
empirical research on ETI focused on the United States, many papers of which had only
narrow data available to them. The data quality has since increased. In recent years,
there has been excellent research from Nordic countries using more comprehensive data.
Kleven & Schultz (2014) estimate taxable income responses with Danish panel data that
covers all Danish population since 1980. For a large tax change in 1980s, a diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences approach produces elasticities in the range of 0.20.3. The results suggest
labor income elasticities around 0.05 for wage earners and 0.10 for self-employed over
a long period. I join the recent trend of using comprehensive administrative data to
address the elasticity estimation challenge.
Furthermore, it is interesting to know about other elasticity studies conducted with
Finnish data in order to compare elasticity estimates among tax bases and income
deﬁnitions. In a paper about income shifting among Finnish business owners, Harju
& Matikka (2016) show that income shifting accounts for the majority of the overall
behavioral response to taxation. With comprehensive data on Finnish business owners,
they study income shifting and real responses using the dividend tax reform of 2005
to generate exogenous variation. Their standard ETI results imply an elasticity of 1.7
for business owners. With income shifting among tax bases separated, they estimate
an income shifting elasticity of 1.4 and the real response component of 0.6. In another
paper, Matikka (2015) uses Finnish data and changes in municipal tax rates to provide
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an estimate of the elasticity of taxable income. The ﬂat municipal tax rate is not a
function of individual income but of municipality3, thus it can be used as an exogenous
instrument. His ETI estimate is 0.16 for earned income. In addition, as in many earlier
studies, the average ETI is slightly larger for women than for men. He also ﬁnds that
ETI is somewhat larger for low-income individuals compared to middle and high-income
individuals.
Despite the challenges in some papers, I detect three main ﬁndings of tax elasticities
observed in the empirical literature. First, the tax elasticities are aﬀected by struc-
tural features such as tax base and tax enforcement parameters, so that the larger the
deduction possibilities and the narrower the tax base, the higher the elasticity. As
an example, tax elasticities in the US were notably higher in the 1980s than in the
1990s (see e.g. Saez et al. 2012; Giertz 2007). Saez et al. (2012) explains that one of
the reasons for this is the narrower tax base and deduction possibilities of the 1980s.
This is supported by results from US by Giertz (2007), who found that the elasticity
with respect to broad income varied less than the elasticity on taxable income between
1980s and 1990s. This backs the argument that changing rules for deductions aﬀects
the elasticity of taxable income.
The second ﬁnding is that the elasticity estimates depend notably of the deﬁnition of
income. There are big diﬀerences between estimates using broad and taxable income
(eg. Gruber & Saez, 2002). A broad deﬁnition of total income does not exclude tax
features such as exemptions and itemized deductions, and it includes all wage income,
interest income, dividends and business income. Gruber & Saez (2002) estimate ETI
with broad and taxable income deﬁnitions, and the choice aﬀects the results signiﬁ-
cantly. Their results imply an estimate of 0.4 for taxable and 0.12 for broad income.
With the same methods as Gruber & Saez, Giertz (2007) obtains an ETI estimate for
taxable income of 0.40 for 1980s and 0.26 for 1990s.4 However, with broad income, the
estimated elasticity is 0.15 for the 1990s and 0.12 for the 1980s. These smaller diﬀer-
ences between broad income estimates also support the ﬁrst-mentioned ﬁnding that the
availability of deductions and exemptions matter for the size ofthe ETI.
3Some deductions for low income earners are applied to municipal taxation.
4He studies larger panel data from 1979 to 2001.
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The third ﬁnding is that income elasticities vary across individual characteristics. First,
the elasticity of taxable income tends to rise with income (Gruber & Saez, 2002; Kleven
& Schultz, 2014). Second, income tax elasticities are typically modest among wage
earners and notably higher among the self-employed (e.g. Bastani & Selin (2014)). As
business owners have more possibilities for tax planning, they are especially sensitive to
changes in tax rates. Simultaneously there appears to be more frictions in labor income;
accordingly ETI estimates for wage earners are often very low. (Saez, 2010; Bastani
& Selin, 2014; Kleven & Schultz, 2014; Chetty et al., 2011) Third, labor income tax
elasticities are often higher for women. (e.g. Matikka, 2015; Kleven & Schultz, 2014)
It is important to note that the dividend tax elasticity and the standard elasticity of
taxable income are conceptually diﬀerent. Dividend ETI captures how much corporate
owners respond to taxation. However, standard ETI, when covering all taxable income,
captures the response in tax revenue. There are few empirical papers about dividend
tax elasticities. Chetty & Saez (2005) focus on the large tax cut on dividend income in
United States enacted in 2003 and its eﬀect on dividend payments. The reform reduced
the taxation of dividend income to a rate of 15%5 instead of facing the regular progres-
sive individual income tax with a top rate of 35%. Chetty & Saez (2005) document a
clear surge in dividend payments on both the extensive (amount of corporations paying
dividend) and the intensive margin (amount of dividend payed). Their results on public
corporations imply an elasticity of 0.5. Yagan (2015) studies the same reform and its
eﬀects on corporate investment. He uses a standard diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach
on c-corporations, which is the most common corporation type in the US. As a control
group, he uses s-corporations, which is a corporate form that was not aﬀected by the
reform. He also estimates a dividend tax elasticity of 0.5.
2.2 Distortions Induced by Dividend Taxation
The dividend tax literature suggests that dividend taxation can inﬂuence corporate
behavior along many margins. The literature ﬁnds that dividend taxes aﬀect corporate
decisions about the scale of dividend distribution. E.g. Chetty & Saez (2005) provide
5Same tax rate as for capital gains
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clear evidence that taxation aﬀects dividend payments. They show that there is a sharp
surge in dividend payments following the 2003 dividend tax cut in the United States.6
However, research on dividend taxation's welfare eﬀects appears rather controversial.
What do the dividend payment responses indicate? Does dividend taxation have real
eﬀects in terms of production and eﬀort, or are the responses merely about tax planning?
I divide responses to dividend taxation into two main lines: ﬁrst  real responses and
second  tax planning responses.
First, I outline the so-called real eﬀects of dividend taxation. The earlier theoretical
literature starting from Feldstein (1970) and Poterba & Summers (1985) states that
dividend taxation causes signiﬁcant real responses through the cost of corporate in-
vestment, since new investment is funded with new equity (old view). In contrast, the
new view suggests that corporate investments are mainly ﬁnanced by retained earnings
and there is no signiﬁcant eﬀect on corporate investment (Auerbach, 1979; King, 1974).
Chetty & Saez (2010) complement the dividend tax literature with a corporate agency
theory. In their set-up, the new view applies to cash rich ﬁrms and the old view to
cash-constrained ﬁrms. Moreover, they argue that dividend taxation may distort corpo-
rate decisions even if the source of investment is retained earnings. This is because the
executive manager's preferences may diﬀer from those of the shareholders', who mainly
aim to maximize proﬁts in the long term, but the manager may have other short term
incentives, such as performance-related pay or favorite projects. The availability of
ﬁnancing aﬀects corporate investments. Due to the potentially notable welfare and
growth consequences, the eﬀect on investment is one of the main concerns of dividend
taxation.
The empirical evidence of dividend taxation's eﬀect on investment is controversial. Ya-
gan (2015) studied the 2003 dividend tax cut in the US.7 This large dividend tax reform
was based on the old view as its aim was to increase investment. As Yagan found no
eﬀect on investment, he concluded that investments are funded with retained earnings
6They investigate the 2003 dividend tax cut in United States and its eﬀect in the dividend dis-
tribution of publicly traded corporations. They use quarterly US stock data starting 1980-Q1 until
2004-Q2. All the results seem robust for controlling proﬁts and other ﬁrm characteristics.
7Dividend tax cut was originally meant to expire. Yagan (2015) also discusses the possible eﬀects
of the original expiration date.
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and riskless debt rather than by selling new shares or taking risky debt. Therefore,
his results support the new view. However, Alstadsæter et al. (2015) provide opposite
evidence from Sweden. They exploit a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach to investigate
whether Sweden's 2006 dividend tax cut increased investment in cash-constrained ﬁrms
relative to cash-rich ﬁrms. They ﬁnd that the tax cut aﬀected the allocation of corpo-
rate investment. According to their results, cash-constrained ﬁrms increased investment
after the dividend tax cut. This evidence supports the old view.
Dividend taxation may also aﬀect the eﬀort of corporate owners. Eﬀort includes a
long-term eﬀect, such as reduced entrepreneurship, and a short term eﬀect on the
labor supply of the self-employed. Since, according to a standard utility maximizing
model, an increase in the tax rate should reduce one's willingness to supply labor,
when a substitution eﬀect exceeds the income eﬀect. Reduced labor supply of a self-
employed means less eﬀort on one's property. Moreover, the dividend taxation restricts
the returns to an investment potentially limiting the willingness of an owner to invest.
If the marginal tax rate is high, it may be that the owner does not ﬁnd it worthwhile
to work more or to expand (decreasing marginal utility).
Discontinuities in Finnish dividend taxation create additional incentives related to the
investment decision of the corporations. Finnish dividend taxation depends on the
net assets of the closely-held corporation. If the dividend relative to net assets is
below a percentage threshold (9 % in 20052011), the dividends are taxed as capital
income. Kari & Karikallio (2007) show theoretically that to avoid higher taxes, the
owner of a closely held corporation in Finland should avoid dividends which would be
taxed as earned income. These funds should instead be invested in ﬁnancial assets, as
some ﬁnancial assets on the balance sheet potentially decrease the dividend taxation
of the shareholder (Kari & Karikallio, 2007). This is a tax planning response; however,
dividend taxation may also encourage a ﬁrm to invest in ﬁnancial assets instead of real
investment on e.g. product development. According to Kari & Laitila (2014), Finnish
dividend taxation may also cause under-investment. They ﬁnd that an owner facing a
non-linear income tax rate prefers a smooth ﬂow of dividends. Therefore, it encourages
new ﬁrms entering the market to begin distributing dividends right from the start,
which reduces investment.
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Next, I discuss the rest of tax planning responses. Perhaps the most notable tax
planning response is income-shifting between income forms. It means shifting income
between e.g. labor and dividend income, since they usually face a diﬀerent tax rate.
Even though the tax base for capital and earned income are the same in most of the
world except the Nordic countries,8 the ﬁnal tax burden usually still diﬀers due to
corporate taxes, deductions and other features. Therefore, business owners have more
possibilities for tax avoidance than wage earners by organizing the structure of the assets
or by choosing between tax bases. Thus, dividend recipients are more able to plan how
they want to invest or, in the case of an entrepreneur, if they want to receive their
income as wage instead of dividends. Devereux et al. (2014) found a relatively small
corporate tax elasticity for large companies (ETI 0.130.17, proﬁt around ¿300,000)
and a relatively large elasticity for small ﬁrms (ETI 0.530.56, proﬁt around ¿10,000).
They explain the result with the fact that small ﬁrms are owner-managed and thus have
the opportunity to raise wage and through that minimize the tax burden, i.e. they have
more incentives and possibilities for income shifting. Income shifting in Finland has
been studied by Harju & Matikka (2016). They ﬁnd evidence that income shifting
between dividend and wage income accounts for majority of the elasticity of taxable
income among Finnish business owners.
The extent of income shifting is induced by the diﬀerences across tax bases. In the
US, the ETI estimates for 1990s are lower than for the 1980s. A credible reason for
this, as pointed out by Saez et al. (2012), is the reduction in the diﬀerences among tax
bases in 1990s. Hence, in addition to the ETI, the extent of income shifting and the
tax rate applied to shifted income are crucial for estimating the tax revenue eﬀects of
a tax reform.
Income shifting is not only about shifting income between wage and capital income, but
it can also include other compensation for the owner, such as fringe beneﬁts. Fringe
beneﬁts, such as a car or a free meal, are often not included when estimating income-
shifting; however, the ETI captures also the eﬀect in fringe beneﬁts. Also repurchases of
stock (a stock buyback, in other words) is a form of income shifting. With repurchases,
8The Nordic dual income tax system is a principal feature of income taxation of individuals in most
Nordic countries and is explained in chapter 3.
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the ﬁrm distributes proﬁts to the shareholders by limiting the number of shares on the
markets, which increases the value of the shares the shareholders have left. Chetty &
Saez (2005) ﬁnd evidence that the 2003 dividend tax cut induced an increase in total
payout rather than substitution between dividends and repurchases.
Corporate owners can respond to dividend taxation also through the choice of location,
organizational form, timing of payment etc. The tax diﬀerences between earnings types
such as corporate and non-corporate income play an important role in ﬁrms' choice of
organizational forms. Moreover, there are signiﬁcant eﬀects of corporate tax policies
on multinationals' location decision and allocation of taxable income among taxing
jurisdictions (Devereux et al., 2014). Dividend taxation can induce similar responses.
In addition, tax reforms aﬀect the timing of dividend payments, as pointed out by Saez
et al. (2012). When a tax reform is known in advance, a corporation may increase or
decrease the level of dividend distribution depending on whether the reform increases
or decreases the tax rate. Such behavior has been witnessed e.g. in United States by
Kleven (2016) and in Finland by Kari et al. (2008).
An increase in the tax rate can also prompt more eﬀort directed to tax evasion. Tax eva-
sion refers to income that is entirely hidden from the tax administration. Kleven et al.
(2011) conducted an interesting experiment on tax evasion in Denmark.9 They found
that the tax evasion rate is close to zero for income subject to third-party reporting, but
substantial for self-reported income. Moreover, they show that marginal tax rates have
a positive impact on tax evasion for self-reported income, but that this eﬀect is small
in comparison to legal avoidance and behavioral responses. Hence, reporting is the key
issue in tax evasion. Tax evasion is diﬃcult or not compelling for a party which does
not report its income by itself, such as an employee. However, the self-employed have
the possibility to deal with some of their taxing personally, opening up possibilities for
evasion e.g. through neglecting to report cash income. Like taxation, also tax evasion
can be considered as income shifting inside the economy. In a closed economy, where
the evaded income stays inside the economy and production does not have externalities,
9In the ﬁrst year a sample of randomly selected tax ﬁlers were thoroughly audited. The next year a
threat of audit was sent to a sample tax ﬁlers some of which experienced the audit previous year and
some did not.
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the welfare implications of evasion depend on whether the potential tax revenue would
be better spent by the government e.g. to a matter with positive externalities such as
education or to re-distribution. Chetty (2009) points out that under assumptions about
risk neutrality, the tax loss due to increased tax evasion is recouped by increased tax
revenue collected at audit.
Due to all these possible tax planning responses, dividend payments are likely to be
elastic with respect to taxation. However, as pointed out by Saez et al. (2012), if revenue
leakage in a certain tax base in a certain year is oﬀset by increased tax revenues in
another year or in other tax bases, the elasticity as a tax revenue measure is misleading.
In addition, if taxes induce changes in behavior with externalities, such as charity or
pollution, then the elasticity does not reveal all of the welfare eﬀects. However, one
should not misconclude that tax-planning would not be costly from a welfare point of
view: the time and eﬀort spent on tax avoidance is also a cost. Corporate owners spend
a great amount of money and time on tax avoidance. Tax consultant services, holding
corporate service etc. constitute a big business. How much corporate owners use tax
avoidance services depends of the tax system, since the tax system aﬀects the elasticity,
as mentioned. If a tax system has a narrow base and plenty of avoidance and deduction
possibilities, it is likely to generate high elasticities.
In principle, the elasticity of taxable income captures all of both tax planning and real
responses. Therefore, it is a summary of marginal eﬃciency costs and is an important
topic of investigation. However, income shifting decreases the dead-weight cost of tax-
ation signiﬁcantly. Therefore, the distinction between tax planning and real responses
is important when assessing welfare conclusions and giving policy recommendations.
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3 Institutional Background
3.1 Description
Since 1993, Finnish income taxation has been characterized by the Nordic dual income
tax system (DIT). In the dual income system, personal capital income, such as capital
gains and rental income, are taxed at a ﬂat capital tax rate. All other income, such as
wages and social beneﬁts, is taxed with a progressive earned income tax rate schedule.
In the DIT, capital income taxation is usually lower than the highest marginal tax rates
on earned income, aiming to boost international capital mobility. The dual income tax
system in Nordic countries is usually motivated by capital mobility and the broadness
of the tax base.
Dividend taxation consists of several features and varies depending of the company
form. The system explained and examined in this study applies to privately held cor-
porations (henkilöomisteinen listaamaton osakeyhtiö). A privately held corporation
refers to a limited company owned by a single person or a group of individuals. The
shares of a privately held corporation are not traded on the stock exchange, unlike the
shares of a public corporation. The taxation of dividends of privately held corporation
is diﬀerent than that of other company forms, such as public companies or coopera-
tives. When computing the overall tax burden on dividends, I aggregate corporate and
dividend taxation together. The corporate tax (yhteisövero) is a tax on the corporate
proﬁt; in 20052011, its rate was 26 %. The taxes are aggregated because the owner
chooses between paying the proﬁt for herself as either dividends, facing a corporate
and a dividend tax, or as a wage, facing an earned income tax. Therefore, from the
owner's point of view, the sum of corporate and dividend taxes is the overall tax of the
distributed proﬁt.
Dividend income from a privately held corporation is taxed with the two diﬀerent tax
schemes of DIT depending on the net assets of the corporation. If the dividend amount
relative to the corporation's net assets is below a certain percentage threshold (8 %
since 2012), dividends are taxed as capital income. If the dividend amount is over
the net asset threshold, a progressive earned income tax is applied to the part over
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Table 2: Marginal dividend tax rates in 20002004 and 20062011
Dividend MTR 2000-2004 MTR 2006-2011
< ¤90,000 & below net asset threshold 29 % 26 %
> ¤90,000 & below net asset threshold 29 % 40.5 %
above net asset threshold 0-∼55 % 26-∼55 %
Table 3: Tax kinks and net asset thresholds in dividend taxation in 2000-2013
Years Kink MTR below MTR above Threshold
2000-2004 - (29 %) (29 %) 9.585 %
2006-2011 ¤90,000 26 % 40.5 % 9 %
2012-2013 ¤60,000 24.5 % 40.36 % 8 %
2014 ¤150,000 26 % 40.4 % 8 %
2015 ¤150,000 26.4 % 41.76 % 8 %
the threshold, but the capital income tax is applied to the dividend amount below the
threshold. (33 Income tax act Finland, 1992)
Earned income taxation in Finland includes a progressive government tax, a ﬂat mu-
nicipal income tax and pension and social security contributions. The earned income
share of the dividends is added to other earned income of the owner and a ﬁnal tax rate
is calculated. The earned income tax rate varies depending on the taxpayer's income
and municipality. Both the municipal and government tax schedules change nearly ev-
ery year. The lowest government tax rate has been zero during the whole period and,
with deductions in the municipal tax for low income earners, also the aggregate earned
income tax rate has been close to zero in the low end of the income distribution. The
highest overall marginal earned income tax rate has been circa 55 %.
Overall government tax rates on earned income have been decreasing during the re-
search period of 2000-2013, especially for low and middle income earners. However, the
municipal income tax has been increasing; in 2000, the average rate was 17.7 %, but in
2013 it was 19.4 %. The municipal income tax varies across municipalities; in 2015 it
ranged from 16.5 % to 22.5 %.
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Figure 1: Marginal tax rates of dividend income (below net asset threshold)
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Figure 2: Average tax rates of dividend income (below the net asset threshold)
3.2 2005 Tax Reform
Since the introduction of the DIT in 1993 until 2005, a full imputation system was ap-
plied to relieve the double taxation of distributed proﬁts, i.e. dividends. The corporate
tax was deduced in the dividend tax, which led to a zero eﬀective tax rate on dividends
(taxed as capital income) at the shareholder level. Before the 2005 tax reform, the tax
rate on capital income and corporate proﬁts was 29 % (124 Income tax act Finland,
1992), while the top marginal tax rate (MTR) on earned income was circa 55 %. To
curb income shifting caused by the wide tax rate gap between these income types, div-
idends were split into capital and earned income in terms of the relative amount to the
16
Gross dividends ¤
Net dividends ¤
06-11
12-13
30k 15090k60k 120k
90k
60k
30k
120k
00-04
Figure 3: Net dividend income relative to corporate income (below the net asset thresh-
old)
corporation's net assets. This meant that dividends exceeding a threshold of 9.585 %
of corporation's net assets were taxed with the progressive earned income tax rate but
without the pension and social security contributions. (124 Income tax act Finland,
1992)
In October 2002 a tax reform panel appointed by the Ministry of Finance handed down
its report on reforming Finnish capital income taxation. The main proposed changes
were a reduction in corporate and capital tax rates from 29 % to 25 % and the removal
of the imputation credit. The proposal suggested a general increase in the taxation
of dividends taxable as capital income; the tax rate would rise from 29 % to 43.5
%. For dividends taxed as earned income, the reform would have caused a potential
reduction in the tax burden, as the division into capital and earned income would have
been removed. The report did not receive the Finnish government's support and the
government introduced its own proposal in November 2003. (Kari et al., 2008)
In the reform the government implemented, the corporate tax rate was cut to 26 %
and the capital income tax rate to 28 %. Instead of full double taxation of dividends,
the government chose a system of partial relief, under which the dividends were made
tax-exempt up to ¿90,000, after which 70 % of dividends were considered as taxable
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capital income. Thus, the owner-level marginal tax rates were 26 % below ¿90,000
and 40.5 %10 over it, including both the corporate and dividend taxes. The splitting of
dividends into capital and earned income according to its size relative to the company's
net assets was maintained in the reform, but the limit was decreased to 9 %. Above
the 9 % threshold, the earned income tax rate was applied to 70 % of the dividends.
Table 2 illustrates the eﬀect of the reform in 2005 for dividends of diﬀerent size and
type. Before 2005, with the imputation credit on place, there is no tier in the marginal
tax rate depending of the amount of the dividends. However, if dividends are above the
net asset threshold of 9.585 per cent, the marginal tax rate above it is determined by
the earned income tax rate, which varies between 0 % and approximately 55 %. The
tax year 2005 was a transition period, but in 2006, the marginal tax rate for dividends
exceeding ¿90,000 rose to 40.5 %, which included the corporate tax rate and the capital
tax on 70 % of the dividend over the kink. Below the kink, the tax burden included
only the corporate tax rate which was reduced to 26 %.
The ﬁnal bill was passed in parliament in 2004 and the reform was implemented starting
in 2005, with that year considered as a transition period. In 2005, the capital tax rate
was applied to 57 % of the dividend income above ¿90,000, the marginal tax rate over
¿90,000 being 36.97 %. The new tax schedule was fully applied only in 2006 (Act 716,
2004). The reform was mainly motivated by the rules of the European Union concerning
principles of equal taxation of all EU citizens. The pre-reform imputation credit was
only granted to domestic shareholders, which violated European Union rules. Thus the
reform was exogenous for domestic shareholders (Harju & Matikka, 2016).
During the reform process, companies had time to organize their ﬁnancial structure
and owners had the possibility to prepare for the changes in order to minimize their
tax burden over time, as the formal proposition was given already in 2003. Kari et al.
(2008) show that ﬁrms that were facing a dividend tax increase (private companies
with dividends taxed as capital income and dividend payment ¿90,000 or more) in-
creased dividend payments in 2003 and 2004, both along the extensive margin, i.e. the
participation to dividend payment activity (dummy) and along the intensive margin,
i.e. the extent of dividend payments (continuous). Their results also imply that while
10100% ∗ (0, 26 + (1− 0, 26) ∗ 0, 7 ∗ 0, 28) ≈ 40, 5%
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companies distributed abnormally high dividends before the reform, they tended to pay
out abnormally low dividends after the reform.
The reform was extensively publicly debated. According to Kari et al. (2008), this
may have had both positive and negative eﬀects: The public discussion might have
corrected misguided policies in the ﬁrst tax reform proposal, but it also made the tax
reform vulnerable to lobbying.
3.3 Further Changes in the Tax Schedule
Table 3 lists all the tax-exempt kinks and net asset thresholds in dividend tax schedules
in use 2000-2015. In 2012, the limit for a tax-exempt in the capital taxation of dividends
was decreased from ¿90,000 to ¿60,000 and the net asset threshold for capital taxation
of dividends was decreased by one percentage point to 8 % of net assets (Government's
proposition 50, 2011). The corporate tax rate was reduced from 26 % to 24.5% and
the capital tax rate increased from 28 % to 30 % up to ¿50,000 and 32 % for taxable
capital income exceeding ¿50,000.11 As a result, the diﬀerence in marginal tax rates
at the kink increased from 14.5 percentage points to 15.86 percentage points.
Figure 1 shows the marginal tax rates on dividends and ﬁgure 2 illustrates the corre-
sponding average tax rates on dividends under the net asset threshold in 2000-2013.
In both ﬁgures there is the dividend amount on the horizontal axis. Figure1 illustrate
how notable the jump in marginal tax rates is after the reform and ﬁgure 2 shows how
it aﬀects the average tax rate.
Figure 3 shows the gross dividend income i.e. the amount of proﬁt required for a certain
amount of net dividend received by the owner. As seen in the ﬁgure, the ﬁrst tax
schedule was ﬂat. Post 2004 there occurs a kink ﬁrst at ¿90,000 and then at ¿60,000.
On the horizontal axis is the proﬁt required for a certain amount of dividend income
after taxes, which is shown in the vertical axis. In the empirical model these curves
serve as budget constraints for the corporate owners. Assuming that the owners are
11This created a small additional kink at the point where ¿50,000 taxable capital income is reached
e.g. ¿207,136.23 in 2012-2013 if no other capital income was received and dividend was below the net
asset threshold.
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continuously distributed along the dividend scale and optimize their utility of dividend
payments with convex indiﬀerence curves relative to these budget constraints, it is
intuitive that the kink will attract bunching. I will return back to this idea in section
5 which introduces the method.
In 2014 and 2015, the dividend tax system has been further reformed. Since 2014, 25 %
of dividend income is taxed as capital income if the dividend income is below ¿150,000
and under 8 % of the net assets of the corporation. The capital income tax rate is
applied to 85 % of the dividends over ¿150,000. If the dividend exceeds the net asset
threshold, earned income tax rate is applied to 75 % of the exceeding part. Capital
tax rates have remained the same, however, the limit between the lower rate of 30 %
and the higher rate of 32 % has decreased ﬁrst to ¿40,000 in 2014 and then to ¿30,000
in 2015 shifting it below the dividend tax kink. However, these later changes are not
the subject of this study. In this thesis, I analyze responses to the three tax schedules
in 2000-2013 and the two reforms in 2005 and 2012. There have been no signiﬁcant
changes in the deﬁnition of net assets during the research period.
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4 Data
Before introducing the method, I brieﬂy describe the rich data required for the empirical
analysis. I use the Yrtti-database which consists annual information on all Finnish
privately held corporations and their main owners. Main owner refers to the shareholder
that received the most dividends from the corporation. The data are obtained annually
from the Finnish tax administration; VATT Institute for Economic Research maintains
the database(VATT, 2016). The yearly data are matched with owner-level data on the
main owners of the company and combined into a panel data-set. The data include
the dividends paid to the owner and several pieces of information on the company such
as wages paid to the owner, turnover, and net assets. Furthermore, the data include
the additions to ﬁxed capital that I use to study the real eﬀects. All the variables are
in nominal terms, inﬂation in Finland was on average 1.8 annually during the research
period (StatisticsFinland, 2016). Table 6 in appendix describes the dividend data.
In the analysis, I observe the years 2000-2013 and the three diﬀerent dividend tax
schedules in use. The data include more than 600,000 observations during the research
period. I pool all years from a single tax rate together. This allows for a larger
sample outweighing outliers. The owner can postpone cashing the dividends from the
ﬁrm. Thus, the dividend tax is paid with the tax rate of the year when the dividend is
cashed, not based on the year of distribution of dividend. Therefore, some of the owners
have several observations from the same company for the same year. As a solution,
observations from an owner-company pair in a single year have been aggregated.
Figure 4 shows how the observations are distributed in 1000-euro dividend bins along
the dividend axis during the diﬀerent tax regimes. The distributions look like typical
exponential probability density functions, except for the spikes around round numbers
and tax kinks. The graph starts from dividends above ¿30,000, since the volume in
the small end of the dividend distribution would outweigh the shapes around the kinks.
The ﬁgure shows clear bunching around the tax kinks. In the next section I explain
how this bunching can be used to estimate the dividend tax elasticity.
21
0
.
00
5
.
01
.
01
5
.
02
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 fi
rm
s
40000 60000 80000 100000 120000
Dividend bin
2000−2004 2006−2011
2012−2013
Dividend distributions during different tax schedules
Figure 4: Dividend income distributions (in bins of ¿1000)
5 Method
5.1 Bunching
I estimate the dividend payment responses to dividend taxation and quantify them using
elasticity of taxable income (ETI). ETI is deﬁned as the ratio of a percentage change in
taxable income to a percentage change in the net-of-tax income rate (one minus the tax
rate). The higher the elasticity, the more strongly taxable income responds to a change
in the tax rate. The dividend ETI captures the excess burden caused by dividend
taxation. The excess burden appears either as tax planning (eg. fringe beneﬁts, income
shifting) or real responses (e.g. reduced eﬀort or investment). It is crucial to note, that
ETI is not the elasticity of proﬁts relative to dividend taxation; it includes that eﬀect,
but it also includes other responses, such as income shifting and tax avoidance.
In the empirical analysis, I use changes in marginal tax rates to estimate the dividend
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tax elasticity. The analysis follows a new method called bunching developed by Saez
(2010).12 The idea is to estimate the elasticity using a tax kink after which the marginal
tax rate increases. The tax kink induces bunching, the extent of which depends on
the elasticity. The majority of the earlier empirical literature has used Diﬀerence-in-
Diﬀerences (DD) method and a change in the tax rate to estimate the ETI. However,
as described in section 2, the newer bunching method has several beneﬁts relative to
the DD. The earlier papers on estimating the ETI have several challenges. The ﬁrst
one is mean reversion. The bunching method uses cross sectional analysis of the shape
of the distribution. Therefore, the reversion to the mean of individual companies does
not distort the results. The second problem with earlier methods is the assumption of
common income trends. The bunching method does not require such an assumption
as there is no time trend in the set up. Third, panel regressions are very sensitive to
the choice of instrument for the marginal tax rate and also somewhat sensitive to the
choice of control group, however there are no such issues with the bunching method.
Moreover, the comprehensive data in use leave no room for data selection.
Following the basic setting of a consumer's maximization problem,13 the owner of a ﬁrm
maximizes one's utility from consumption and leisure over the disutility of providing
labor for one's own corporation. Marginal disutility can be thought as the cost of eﬀort
of the owner and it is captured by gross dividends, and the consumption allowed by the
after-tax dividend income generates utility. Hence, the owner of a company chooses a
dividend amount for which the marginal disutility of the payment equals the marginal
utility of the dividend. Assuming that individual preferences are convex and smoothly
distributed in the population, there should exist bunching at the convex kink points of
the budget set (Saez, 2010).
Figure 5 describes the intuition graphically. The solid line is the relation between cor-
porate proﬁt (gross dividend) needed to ﬁnance a certain amount of net dividend. At
¿90,000, the marginal tax rate increases. Consider that the tax payers maximize their
utility relative to the budget set. Assume that the black curve is a hypothetical indif-
12Chetty et al. (2011), Bastani & Selin (2014), Devereux et al. (2014) and Brockmeyer (2014) among
other have used and advanced the bunching method and Kleven (2016) provides an excellent review
of it.
13Varian (2009) provides a good introduction to consumer's utility maximization problems.
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Figure 5: Net dividends relative to corporate income 2006-2011 and hypothetical indif-
ference curves
ference curve of an individual, who decides to raise dividend exactly ¿90,000 despite
the kink in the budget set. The dashed black line is the budget set in the absence of
the kink. The dashed gray curve is the optimal dividend of another individual in that
setting. After the introduction of the kink, this dashed gray individual, who earlier lo-
cated at around ¿100,000, moves to a lower indiﬀerence curve (solid gray) and locates
at ¿90,000 together with the black individual. As the black individual does not move
anywhere, there are now more individuals than in the case of a linear budget set. I use
this bunching induced by the kink to estimate the elasticity of taxable income.
Following Saez (2010), I assume a quasi-linear utility function ui(c, z) = c − vi(zt,i),
where c is consumption, zt,i is gross dividend income and vi(zt,i) denotes the cost of eﬀort
to produce income for individual i at time t. The cost function is convex and increasing
in z. The individual maximizes utility under the budget constraint c = z(1− τs) + R,
where (1− τs) is the net-of-tax rate on a linear segment of the tax schedule s and R is
virtual income. Virtual income refers to the additional income generated by deductions
and transfers, which in this case equals the lost tax revenue under the kink τs·k. Without
income eﬀects, the elasticity is equal to both the compensated and uncompensated
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elasticity and ETI can be estimated using a Hicksian demand function (Saez et al.,
2012). Leaving income eﬀects aside, the elasticity tracks only the substitution eﬀect
which accounts for the majority of the response (Gruber & Saez, 2002). The ﬁrst order
condition u′i(z) = (1 − τs) − v′i(z) = 0 gives the optimality condition v′i(z) = (1 − τs).
Thus, taxable dividend income is a function of the net-of-tax rate of dividend income.
Reported income zt,i responds to marginal tax rates with elasticity e so that
zt,i = z
0
t,i · (1− τs)e (1)
where z0t,i is the so-called potential income, i.e. income reported when the marginal tax
rate is zero . The indices i and t are from now on omitted for the sake of brevity.
Considering a marginal change in the net-of-tax rate, d(1−τ), the compensated elastic-
ity of taxable income is the marginal change in taxable income relative to the marginal
change in the net of tax rate
e(z) =
dz
z
d(1−τ)
1−τ
=
(1− τ)
z
dz
d(1− τ) , (2)
where e(z) is the ETI for income amount z. For small tax changes 4(1− τ)→ d(1− τ)
and 4z → dz, the compensated elasticity locally at kink k is
e(k) =
dz
k
(1− τ)
d(1− τ) =
4z
k
(1− τ)
4(1− τ) (3)
e(k) =
4z
k4(1−τ)
1−τ
. (4)
Dividend income at kink k and a change in the marginal tax rate
4(1− τ)
(1− τ) are observ-
able. Furthermore, 4z can be estimated using the bunching response at the kink. The
bunching at the kink, B(4z), is estimated using dividend earnings density distribution
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h0(z). Following the Mean Value Theorem
14, the excess mass is
B(4z) =
k+4zˆ
k
h0(z)dz = 4zh0(ξ) (5)
for someξ ∈ [k, k +4z].
Rearranging gives 4z = B(4z)
h0(ξ)
, where B(4z) is the realized distribution and h0(ξ) is
the distribution without the kink. For simplicity I refer to
B(4z)
h0(ξ)
as b. By inserting
this and using
4(1− τ)
(1− τ) ≈ log
(
1−τ1
1−τ2
)
, the structural compensated elasticity (ETI) e(k)
at the kink is
e(k) =
b
k · log
(
1−τ1
1−τ2
) (6)
5.2 Estimating ETI with Counter-factual Distribution
To measure the excess mass at the kinks, I need to estimate a counter-factual distribu-
tion. It describes what the distribution would be if there were no kinks in the choice
set. Figure 4 presents the actual distribution of all three tax schedules in 1000-euro
bins. As expected, there is a clear peak around the tax kink of 90 000 in 2005-2011 and
a peak in the 60 000 kink in 2012-2013. However, there are also peaks at other round
numbers indicating that owner's have a tendency to take out round amounts of divi-
dends. Thus, for computing the excess amount of individuals caused by the tax kink, I
need to take into account the regular bunching around round numbers. Otherwise, the
counter-factual distribution would be imprecise and as the kink is located at a round
number, the results would be biased.
I estimate a seventh degree polynomial excluding the data near the kink and create a
dummy variable to take into account the regular excess mass around round numbers
following Devereux et al. (2014) and Kleven & Waseem (2013). The counter-factual
14For a continuous f(x) on [a, b] the Mean Value Theorem implies the existence of c ∈ [a, b] such that
F (b)−F (a)
b−a = F
′(c) or equivalently F (b)− F (a) = F ′(c)(b− a), which implies ´ b
a
f(x)dx = f(c)(b− a).
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distribution is estimated as
Cˆ0j =
p∑
i=0
β0i · (Zj)i + ρ · 1
[
Zj
r
∈ N
]
+ εj, Zj /∈ [−R;R] (7)
where Cˆ0j is the estimate of the counter-factual distribution C
0
j in each bin j at dividend
income Zj. β
0
i are the regression estimates, with p is the degree of the estimated
polynomial. ρ is a dummy variable capturing a global round number ﬁxed eﬀect and r
is the scale where round number bunching occurs. As visible in ﬁgure 4, round number
bunching occurs in tens of thousands. N is the set of natural numbers.15 [−R;R] is the
excluded range of the distribution; the area where the kink occurs.
Cj is the actual realized distribution
Cj =
p∑
i=0
β0i · (Zj)i + ρ · 1
[
Zj
r
∈ N
]
+
R∑
i=−R
γ0i · 1 [Zj = i] + εj. (8)
It is similar to the estimated counter-factual distribution except that it has a bunching
ﬁxed eﬀect γ0i . The realized distribution is observed as the dividend distribution the
data yield. The excess mass is computed by subtracting the counter-factual distribution
from the realized distribution:
Bˆj = Cj − Cˆ0j , (9)
where Bˆ is the estimate of the excess mass in each bin in the area. The sum of the
excess mass in each bin of the bunching range is
R∑
j=−R
Bˆ =
R∑
j=−R
(
Cj − Cˆ0j
)
. (10)
Finally, I estimate bunching bˆ as the excess mass around the kink relative to the average
15When r = 10000, if
Zj
10000 is a natural number, the dummy ρ plays a role.
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density of the counter-factual dividend distribution between −R and R
bˆ =
∑R
j=−R Bˆj∑R
j=−R Cˆ
0
j /(2R + 1)
. (11)
The estimate bˆ is then inserted to equation 6, from which I obtain the elasticity estimate.
5.3 Standard Errors by Bootstrapping
Following earlier bunching literature, such as Chetty et al. (2011), I calculate the stan-
dard error for bˆ by using a parametric bootstrap method. Bootstrapping is a useful
method, when the asymptotic distribution of an estimator is hard to compute. I draw
repeatedly residual samples from the population and estimate bootstrap sampling distri-
butions. Resampling residuals allows me to estimate new counter-factual distributions
by iteration i.e. recomputing using the estimated ei. The procedure is repeated a large
number of times (N = 300). Fox (2015) provides a good introduction to bootstrapping.
First, I retain the values Cˆ0i obtained from the counter-factual distribution and compute
the residuals eˆi = C
0
i − Cˆ0i , (i = 1, . . . , I), where C0i is the actual distribution (bunching
area omitted) and I is the amount of bins. Next, I create a new synthetic variable C∗i :
C∗i = Cˆ
0
i + eˆj, so that for each pair (zi,C
0
i ), in which zi is the explanatory variable
(the ith dividend income bin), I add a randomly resampled residual eˆj from the list of
bins for every i,(i = 1, . . . , I) to the response variable Ci. In other words, I draw with
replacement from the residuals of all the observations and add them randomly to the
estimates of the observation creating a new synthetic distribution. Then, I reﬁt the
model using the synthetic response variables C∗i and obtain a new estimated counter-
factual distribution Cˆ∗j . From this I can retain the estimates of bunching following the
method in the previous section. As in equation 9, the excess mass in each bin i is
Bˆ∗i = Ci − Cˆ∗i and following equation 11 I obtain the synthetic bunching by
bˆ∗n =
∑R
i=−R Bˆ
∗
i∑R
i=−R Cˆ
∗
i /(2R + 1)
. (12)
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I will repeat this for a large amount (N) of times. n denotes the round of the bootstrap
procedure (n = 1, ..., N). Finally, I have a large number N of synthetic estimates bˆ∗n
for the extent of bunching b, (n = 1, ..., N) and I can compute the standard error for
the excess mass. First, I compute the mean of all synthetic estimates E(bˆ∗n) =
∑N
n
ˆb∗in
N
.
Using this, I estimate the population variance σˆ2 =
∑N
n E
[
(bˆ∗n−E(bˆ∗n))
2
]
N
and the standard
error SEb =
√
σˆ2.
SEb(bˆ) =
[(
1
N
) N∑
n=1
(
bˆ∗n − E(bˆ∗n)
)2] 12
(13)
The standard error for the elasticity is estimated by ﬁrst computing the elasticity for
each bootstrapped bunching estimate following the equation 6,
eˆ∗n(k) =
bˆ∗n
k · log
(
1−τ1
1−τ2
) , (14)
and then computing the standard error as the standard deviation of the bootstrapped
elasticity sample's population mean,
SEe(eˆ) =
[(
1
N
) N∑
n=1
(
eˆ∗n − E(eˆ∗n)
)2] 12
. (15)
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6 Results
6.1 Excess Mass and the Elasticity of Taxable Income
This sub-section represents the elasticity estimation results obtained with the bunching
method. While the dividend tax elasticity captures both tax planning and real eﬀects,
I will devote the next sub-section for distinguishing these eﬀects.
Figure 6 provides the results estimated with the tax schedule in place in 20062011.
The horizontal axis is the dividend amount relative to the ¿90,000 kink with zero as the
kink and the frequency of ﬁrms in each 1000-euro-bin is on the vertical. The solid line
in the ﬁgure is the actual observed dividend distribution around the kink, as in ﬁgure
4. As theory predicts, there appears a substantial excess mass at the tax kink. The
dashed line is the counter-factual distribution, which takes into account bunching at
round numbers and excludes the area near the kink. The vertical lines around the kink
show where the excess mass occurs, i.e., the excluded range [−R;R]. Following earlier
literature, it is selected visually and excluded from the counter-factual distribution.
The estimated excess mass is 10.6 times the counterfactual mass, with a standard error
of less than two. The corresponding dividend tax elasticity is estimated using the excess
mass caused by the increase in marginal tax rates from 26 % to 40.5 %. The elasticity
is 0.54 with a standard error of 0.01.
Figure 7 shows the estimates of excess mass and dividend tax elasticity in 20122013
with a slightly bigger kink at ¿60,000. Excess mass is now 8.363 (1.75) times the
counterfactual mass and the ETI is 0.59 (0.1). The elasticity estimates using two
diﬀerent schedules are very close to each other; considering the conﬁdence intervals,
they are indistinguishable. The bunching evidence is very clear compared to earlier
literature, whereas the elasticity estimates are close to the ETI estimates of 0.5 obtained
by Chetty & Saez (2005) and Yagan (2015) with US data.
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To conﬁrm that the bunching is indeed caused by the rise in the marginal tax rate, I
compute the same distribution before the particular kink was introduced in ﬁgure 16
in the appendix. Both graphs in the ﬁgure show that there appears only round number
bunching before the tax reforms. In the 90,000-euro-bin, you may notice that there is
actually less bunching than in the counter-factual distribution before 2005. That may
be because of the extra bunching accumulated at the ¿100,000, which has not been
considered in the estimation of the counter-factual distribution.
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Figure 8: Yearly excess mass and elasticity at the kink
Next, I plot the excess mass and elasticity yearly to see if there is a trend over time or if
the results in ﬁgures 6 and 7 are distorted by the pooling of the years. Both the excess
mass and the corresponding elasticity seem rather consistent across years, as the values
estimated with yearly data show in ﬁgure 8. The dots show the yearly excess mass and
elasticity (vertical axis) and the gray lines indicates the 95 percent conﬁdence intervals
in each year. The excess mass before 2005 acts as a placebo excess mass at ¿90,000,
i.e. the excess mass before the kink was introduced, similarly as in the robustness check
in ﬁgure 16 in the appendix. After the introduction of the kink, only 2005 seems like an
exception in the estimates. However, 2005 was a transition period: In 2005, after the
¿90,000 kink, the capital tax rate was applied to 57 % of the dividend income, so the
marginal tax rate was 37 %. Only starting in 2006, the new schedule was fully applied.
This suggests that the excess mass is likely to be lower in 2005 as the diﬀerences in
marginal tax rates is smaller. Even though the excess mass is understandably smaller,
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you would still expect the elasticity to be similar to the elasticity obtained when the
new tax system is fully applied. However this is not observed. I consider that the
lower elasticity can be explained with optimization frictions, such as that it takes time
for the tax payers to learn the new tax system and adapt to it. This is consistent
with the initial bunching paper by Saez (2010), in which he also found evidence of tax
payers learning to bunch over time. However we do not notice a similar learning process
in 2012 when the kink was relocated: In 2012, ﬁrms adjust their dividend payments
instantly. Even though the elasticity is a local ETI estimate, the estimates after 2012
are of the same scale with the earlier ones. This suggests that the estimated ETI of
around 0.5-0.6 is a relevant measure for a wider region.
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Figure 9: Persistence of bunching in dividend bins around 90k in 2005-2011
There is a substantial excess mass at the kink year after year. Figure 9 studies whether
this bunching is created by the same owners year to year. The ﬁgure shows that the
persistence of ﬁrms at the kinks is exceptionally strong compared to surrounding bins.
The ﬁgure shows the proportion of ﬁrms bunching that located in the same bin also
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14 years earlier. On the horizontal axis is the dividend bin relative to the 90,000-euro-
kink and on the vertical axis is the proportion of ﬁrms staying in the particular bin.
After a year, the persistence rate is nearly a half and even after four years, persistence
is still almost 10 %, whereas in surrounding bins, it is close to zero by then. Notice
that the scale of the y-axis decreases in the ﬁgures. The sample covers all the years
2005-2011. These results indicate that bunching is induced partly by the same ﬁrms
every year. Figure 17 in the appendix is a placebo ﬁgure of persistence. It shows
the persistence in the same part of the dividend distribution but before the kink was
introduced (20002004). There is no dissenting persistence at the kink in the ﬁgure,
which indicates that the higher persistence rates are indeed due to the kink. Table 7 in
the appendix regresses the bunchers with the evidence of earlier bunching and conﬁrms
the persistence at least up to third lag.
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Figure 10: 60k bunchers of 2013 without the movers from 90k kink
When the kink was relocated from ¿90,000 to ¿60,000, many owners changed their
dividend payments to match the new kink. Figure 10 shows that, by excluding the
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bunchers of 20102011, excess mass and elasticity at the ¿60,000 kink in 2013 are
about one third smaller. The ﬁgure indicates that a signiﬁcant number of ﬁrms are
very responsive to the discontinuities in the tax schedule and change their dividend
payments notably to match the new kink. This as well as ﬁgure 9 suggests there is
heterogeneity in the responsiveness to taxation among tax payers. Some tax payers
are more sensitive to changes in tax rates and respond more strongly than others. The
ETI only describes the average response at the kink. Additional features of strong
respondents are examined in the next sub-chapter.
6.2 Descriptive Analysis of Real and Tax Planning Responses
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Figure 11: Owner and corporate characteristics
While it is now clear that corporate owners respond strongly to dividend taxation
by adjusting dividend payments, it is unclear whether the responses are only about
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tax planning or whether they include also real eﬀects on corporate behavior. Next,
I use the dividend tax reform of 2012, when the kink was relocated from ¿90,000 to
¿60,000, to investigate the responses. The reform of 2012 induced a sharp adjustment
in dividends as described in the previous sub-section, therefore, it provides a better
point of comparison than the ﬁrst reform of 2005 with a transition period.
Figure 11 shows the distributions of few owner and corporate characteristics in 5000-
euro-bins around the tax kinks. Each distribution is drawn in 20102011, before the
reform when the tax kink located at the ¿90,000, and after the reform in 20122013
when the tax kink was at ¿60,000. The ﬁrst graph in ﬁgure 11 shows the owner's
wage share of their overall income and that after the 2012 reform, this wage share
increased. This is to be expected if dividends decrease and wage stays the same but,
as the changes seem quite large, there may also be some income shifting. The second
graph shows that the average net assets of the ﬁrms increased substantially in 2012
among ﬁrms paying approximately ¿60,000 in dividends to it's main owners. Looking
at the situation before the tax change and noting the movement discovered in ﬁgure 10
suggests that the increase is partly driven by the ﬁrms that relocated from the ¿90,000
kink.
The third graph shows the changes in ﬁxed capital. I use data on the investments on
ﬁxed capital to study the real responses to the reform because aggregate investment can
be dominated by investment in ﬁnancial assets. I consider investment in ﬁnancial assets
mainly as a tax planning response rather than a real eﬀect, since investment on ﬁnancial
assets does not generally aﬀect the production of the ﬁrm, whereas the ﬁnancial beneﬁts
of it are substantial for the owner for two reasons. First, the tax reform of 2012 reduced
the net asset threshold for dividends taxed as capital income from 9 % to 8 %. Investing
in ﬁnancial assets is a way to ensure the lower capital tax base for dividends without
aﬀecting the scale of production16. Second, using proﬁts to save in ﬁnancial assets and
stocks through the ﬁrm leads to a lower tax burden than would personal saving, since
the owner would ﬁrst need to take out the proﬁt as wages or dividends and invest out
of post-tax income. By investing inside the ﬁrm, the owner avoids the extra income tax
which allows for lower taxation. Therefore, I want to distinguish between the eﬀects on
16The dividend taxation depends of the net assets, as discussed in chapter 3.
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real and ﬁnancial investment. The third graph shows that there is an increase in ﬁxed
capital at the kink after the reform. However, the pattern before the reform is not as
clear as for net assets. Indeed, as the fourth graph shows, the same increasing trend
among ﬁrms around ¿60,000 kink applies to ﬁnancial assets, which suggests that the
increase in net assets at the kink is partly driven by an increase in ﬁnancial assets.
Studying the responses only in dividend bins is not suﬃcient due to two challenges.
First of all, the owners who located to a certain dividend bin in one year are likely
to move away as the dividend taxation increases leaving little to observe. Second, by
following the exact owners who paid a certain amount of dividends before the reform,
the results are likely to be biased due to mean reversion. Therefore, I next pursue
our analysis by studying the owners in quantiles of income from the ﬁrm. Dividing
the owners into quantiles based on their dividends or income from the ﬁrm captures
the movement along the income distribution and allows assessing the part of owner
distribution that was aﬀected by the reform.
Studying the ﬁrms in income quantiles indicates that owners respond to the reform
by shifting income between dividends and wage. In ﬁgure 12, I have distributed the
main owners into 50 quantile groups based on the aggregate income received from the
ﬁrm as both wage and dividends. The horizontal axis shows the average dividends
received and the vertical axis the average wage earned by the owner in the particular
income quantile group.17 In other words, each marker in the ﬁgure indicates means
of wage and dividend income inside two income percentiles. The gray isoquant lines
indicate the same gross income amount with diﬀerent diﬀerent combinations of wage
and dividend income. The lines show the aggregate income so that e.g. corporations
in the 42nd quantile group paid approximately ¿90,000 in wage and dividends to it's
main owners. The graph shows that every quantile receiving minimum of circa ¿90,000
income shifted their income towards wage. However, the owners in these quantiles did
not reduce their income as observed when noting the isoquant lines. They have slightly
increased their income as have the owners in the lower quantiles. As a robustness check
I have added years 20082009 in the ﬁgure. They are indicated by the densely dashed
line which shows that the distribution was very similar during the years before the
17Table 8 in the appendix shows the means in each quantile.
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Figure 12: The main owner's average income in quantiles
reform, except for the increasing trend across the distribution and the highest quantile.
The variation in the highest quantile is very likely to be high due to transitory income
or because possible anticipation eﬀects right before the reform. Anyhow, 50th quantile
group covers only two percent of the owners who did not face a notable increase in the
MTR. The parallel trends before 2012 indicates that the shift in the distribution was
indeed induced by the the reform.
Figure 13 records the same income shifting pattern as a diﬀerence between records in
2012 and 2011. The horizontal axis shows the income quantile (50) and the vertical axis
the average change in income, dividends and wage of the main owners. Essentially the
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changes in wages and dividends reﬂect one another. The ﬁrst two vertical dashed lines
(gray) indicate the income quantiles at which the income in 2011 exceeded ¿60,000 and
then ¿90,000. The second two dashed lines (black) indicate the income quantiles where
the average dividends received by the owners exceed ¿60,000 and ¿90,000 in 2011. The
ﬁgure 13 tells the same story as ﬁgure 12: owners receiving more than ¿90,000 in wages
and dividends shifted their income to wage. Observing the black line shows that up
to 54th income quantile (ca. ¿109,000 in both years) income from the ﬁrm increased
across the distribution. However, in income quantiles over 45th quantile, the increase
in wage did not oﬀset the decrease in dividends.
Figure 14 describes how average wages and dividends evolve, when the owners are
divided into quantile groups based on the amount of dividends. Each group consists of
ﬁve percentiles. The horizontal axis shows average dividends and the vertical axis the
average wage in each dividend quantile group. The graph shows that, whereas dividends
naturally decrease only in dividend quantiles over ¿60,000, the income shifting eﬀect
(increase in wage) is observed across the entire dividend distribution.
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Graphical analysis of dividend quantiles does not suggest a negative real investment
response to the reform. To study the eﬀects on real investments, I use data on in-
vestments on ﬁxed capital. Following Yagan (2015), I have winsorized (top coded) the
highest and lowest percentile of the yearly changes in net real investment to avoid occa-
sional massive investment dominating the investment changes. Figure 15 shows how the
ﬁrms in the highest dividend quantile groups changed their investment behavior. The
horizontal axis shows the dividend quantiles. The dividend quantiles 5557, marked
with dashed lines, are the quantiles paying dividend between ¿60,000¿90,000 in 2011
(the quantiles with a marginal tax increase18). The vertical axis shows the average
diﬀerence in net real investment in 20112012. Clearly, the graph does not uncover any
decrease in investment; on the contrary it shows that the investment diﬀerences are
higher on average in the quantiles that faced a tax increase. Though considering the
large conﬁdence intervals, the diﬀerence in the quantiles with increased dividend tax
does not diﬀer from zero. Moreover, ﬁgure 18 in the appendix shows that the variation
across years, in addition to quantiles, is large, therefore, the evidence is weak. I test
18Table 9 in the appendix shows the means of each dividend quantile.
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Figure 15: Average change in net investment in each dividend quantile
whether the increase in the whole area facing a tax increase is jointly signiﬁcant with
a simple dummy regression. The regression results in table 4 indicate that the reform
increased rather than decreased net real investments of the ﬁrms in quantiles facing a
dividend tax increase.
As noted in ﬁgure 15, the income shifting response is observed across the dividend
distribution. Therefore, I regress the real investment responses on income rather than
dividend quantiles, as some of the ﬁrms that responded may have been left out. I
consider income quantiles that show a response in ﬁgure 13 as the quantiles facing a
tax increase. Running the regression on income quantiles in table 5 does not indicate
any signiﬁcant response in net investment. The dummy indicates to those quantiles
that reacted to the tax increase by income shifting, based on ﬁgure 13; therefore, it is
to be expected that the wage change in income quantiles is signiﬁcant. Figure 19 in the
appendix shows the average changes in net investment across income quantiles. The
observed investment changes are noisy, but nonetheless, it seems that the increase in
dividend taxation in 2012 did not cause a signiﬁcant negative response in real investment
in the short term at least.
41
Table 4: Regression with dividend quantiles
(1) (2)
∆ Net investments ∆ Wage
Quantile 41.71 15.32
(0.37) (1.06)
Dummy: quantiles that faced a tax increase 16629.1∗∗ 1690.7∗
(quantile > 53) (2.72) (2.16)
Constant 1413.9 1408.9∗∗
(0.40) (3.13)
N 60 60
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Lastly, I brieﬂy discuss the responses in ﬁnancial assets. Figure 20 in the appendix
shows clearly how the ﬁnancial assets among the ﬁrms in the dividend quantile closest
to ¿90,000 drop after the reform and increase at the quantile closest to the new ¿60,000
kink. This indicates that bunchers either adjust their ﬁnancial assets or the ﬁrms with
higher than average ﬁnancial assets move to match the new kink or perhaps both. Figure
21 in the appendix uncovers that corporations in the ﬁnance and insurance sector are
over-represented at the kink. Each graph in the ﬁgure shows the share of corporations
in the mentioned industry relative to all observations in 1000-euro-bins (bins are on
the horizontal and share on the vertical axis). The black line shows the share in each
bin and the dashed line the share of the industry in the data. Even though owners of
ﬁnance- and insurance-related ﬁrms represent only 8 % of all the observations in the
data, there is a spike the reaches more the 17 % at the kink. First, this indicates that
ﬁrms on ﬁnancial or insurance business are more responsive to tax incentives than an
average ﬁrm. Second, some of the excess mass of ﬁnancial assets at the kink observed
in ﬁgure 11 may be induced by the amount of ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
The analysis in this section shows that, while the owners respond to dividend tax
reforms substantially by adjusting dividends and shifting income, there are no evident
real responses in investment behavior. Financial assets of the ﬁrms do respond to
dividend taxation, however, I count that as a tax planning response rather than a real
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Table 5: Regression with income quantiles
(1) (2)
∆ Net investments ∆ Wage
Quantile 75.26 28.48
(0.60) (1.11)
Dummy: quantiles that reacted to the tax increase 9826.3 7049.7∗∗∗
(quantile > 50) (1.68) (5.89)
Constant 686.3 27.64
(0.19) (0.04)
N 60 60
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
one.
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7 Conclusions
This thesis shows that discontinuities in Finnish dividend tax schedule in 20052013
induce substantial responses in dividend payments. I ﬁnd exceptionally large bunching
at the kinks of ¿90,000 and ¿60,000, which provides clear evidence that corporate
owners respond strongly to dividend taxation. The dividend tax elasticity estimated
is approximately 0.5. However, as noted by Saez et al. (2012), the taxable income
elasticities may overstate the welfare implications if a notable part of the responses is
tax planning, such as income-shifting, rather than real responses. Moreover, my results
show that the persistence among bunchers is substantial and, as the threshold was
relocated, a considerable amount of corporate owners adjusted their dividend payments
to match the new kink.
The reliability of my estimates arises from the coverage of the data and the fewer simpli-
fying assumptions needed in the bunching method. Most earlier literature uses changes
in tax schedules and a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach to estimate the elasticity. The
bunching method brings a number of beneﬁts to the model as, for example, there is no
need for the common trends assumption, nor are the results are not biased by mean
reversion. My results are in line with earlier papers by Chetty & Saez (2005) and Yagan
(2015), who obtain very similar ETI estimates from the US, despite the diﬀerences in
the tax systems. Relative to an ETI of earned income 0.16 in Finland, obtained by
Matikka (2015), my estimate on dividend income is much higher. This is in line with
earlier research arguing that elasticities are higher for self-employed.
Over the past decades, the economic literature has discussed real responses to dividend
taxation without reaching a consensus. Accordingly, I study the eﬀects of dividend
taxation on investment behavior and other features of small-to-medium sized ﬁrms.
My results do not suggest that ﬁrms facing a dividend tax increase decreased their
real investments in the short run. In fact, the descriptive results suggest that most of
the responses were related to tax planning responses such as income-shifting. Despite
the strong payment responses to a dividend tax increase, the results of investment
responses seem to support the new view of dividend taxes having little or no eﬀect on
corporate investment. On the contrary, it seems that the corporate owners react to
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dividend taxation mainly by tax planning. For instance, it seems that the same ﬁrms
that react to kinks also adjust their net assets (aﬀects the dividend tax too) by investing
in ﬁnancial assets. In addition, it appears that especially ﬁrms in the ﬁelds of ﬁnance
and insurance are responsive to tax incentives. My results are mainly descriptive but
they serve as a basis for further analysis of the responses to dividend taxation.
As mentioned earlier the dividend income reform of 2003 in US was motivated with
growth eﬀects. Furthermore, the act was named as Jobs and Growth Act, but accord-
ing Yagan (2015), the reform was not eﬀective in producing jobs and growth. However,
Alstadsæter et al. (2015) did ﬁnd an eﬀect among cash-constrained ﬁrms in Sweden.
When rationalizing tax reforms, it is useful to have empirical evidence to back the argu-
ments. My results indicate that in the short term, Finnish corporate owners are mainly
responsive to dividend taxation through tax planning rather than through investment
decisions. Thus, this thesis suggests that dividend income tax reforms motivated solely
with short term growth eﬀects should be treated with caution.
This topic as such has not been studied empirically in Finland before and my thesis
contributes to the earlier literature in several ways. First, my thesis contributes to
tax elasticity literature by providing a credible estimate of dividend tax elasticity esti-
mated using the bunching method. Second, it contributes to dividend tax literature by
using empirical evidence on the responses to dividend taxation. In addition to the div-
idend tax elasticity estimate, this thesis provides further description of the behavioral
responses. The descriptive results support the new view of dividend literature, sug-
gesting that dividend taxation does not induce signiﬁcant real responses in corporate
investment. Third, this thesis provides new analysis of the Finnish income tax system.
The elasticity of taxable income is a key parameter in evaluating tax policy, as it helps
policy planners to estimate the eﬀect a tax cut or an increase may induce. Nonetheless,
one should not forget that the elasticity of taxable income is a function of the tax base
and income shifting possibilities and incentives (such as diﬀerences among tax bases)
among others. Thus, the broadness of the tax base and income shifting incentives need
to be taken into account when planning reforms. My descriptive results on income
shifting and adjustment in ﬁnancial assets underline this conclusion.
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Appendix  Additional Tables and Figures
Table 6: Dividend data description
Year N mean median sd
2000 31803 20966.66 7568.46 94630.22
2001 36163 23443.35 8409.4 95089.28
2002 38350 25484.19 8577.58 102259.1
2003 41079 27258.57 9750 125212
2004 32301 31683.01 10500 153813.4
2005 46918 25391.88 8740 90428.29
2006 49105 21770.61 7619 75529.67
2007 51240 23046.07 8000 86678.58
2008 54219 24521.32 8036 96523.81
2009 56103 24709.47 8037 99384.89
2010 57346 26121.49 8284.75 119848.1
2011 58958 27876.71 8513 137358.5
2012 62798 25530.08 8460 144185
2013 66964 25500.36 8560 108521.9
2000-2004 179696 25793.85 8790.17 116123.3
2005-2011 373889 24869.89 8100 104017.7
2012-2013 129762 25514.74 8500 127036.8
Total 683347 25235.31 8409.4 111940
Source:Finnish Tax Administration
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Figure 16: Robustness check of the bunching evidence
Notes: These graphs serve as a robustnes check that the bunching at the kink is actually
induced by the tax threshold. Both ﬁgures show, that there was no excess bunching
other than round number bunching at the kink before the kink was introduced.
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Figure 17: Persistence of bunching in 90k dividend bin 2000-2004
Notes: This ﬁgure serves as a robustness check that the persistence at the kink is induced
by the tax threshold. The ﬁgure shows that there was no exceptional persistence at
¿90,000 in 20002004, when there was no kink.
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Table 7: Regression
(1) (2) (3)
buncher buncher buncher
Buncher previous year 0.408∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗
(43.48) (25.76) (25.68)
Buncher 2 previous years 0.174∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗
(10.71) (10.43)
Buncher 3 previous years 0.141∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
(7.91) (5.09)
Buncher 4 previous years 0.0740∗∗
(2.88)
Buncher 5 previous years 0.0719∗
(2.25)
Buncher 6 previous years -0.0272
(-0.51)
Constant 0.245∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗
(57.42) (55.94) (55.87)
Observations 13385 13385 13385
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: This table shows the bunchers in each year regressed with their earlier bunching
evidence. It indicates persistence among the bunchers.
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Table 8: Means in 50 income quantiles
Income Dividends Wage
Quantile 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012
30 53370.58 55024.18 14024.95 14380.33 39345.63 40643.84
31 55351.36 56975.12 15184.02 15091.63 40167.34 41883.49
32 57392.37 59138.7 14863.47 22205.16 42528.89 36933.54
33 59534.46 61001.13 19276.85 20068.7 40257.61 40932.43
34 61861.98 63276.05 18505.06 17638.65 43356.91 45637.4
35 64423.36 65705.29 19291.53 19563.3 45131.83 46141.99
36 67200.99 68618.3 20703.82 21435.71 46497.18 47182.6
37 70257.3 71651.8 23477.39 22862.91 46779.92 48788.9
38 73466.12 74785.66 23765.25 24991.6 49700.87 49794.06
39 77102.74 78335.06 26383.22 27835.35 50719.52 50499.71
40 81164.84 82182.02 29980.73 27317.68 51184.11 54864.34
41 85789.91 86563.07 32984.29 30672.97 52805.62 55890.1
42 90790.28 91374.8 40843.68 34963.02 49946.61 56411.79
43 96357.12 97052.09 38672.57 36179.19 57684.54 60872.89
44 103278 103742.5 46266.04 39872.72 57012.01 63869.78
45 112232.4 111924.6 50326.95 44089.41 61905.44 67835.16
46 123619.3 122542.4 58232.14 51116.29 65387.13 71426.06
47 138387 136763.3 65961.66 57633.75 72425.34 79129.53
48 160904.4 158247.5 84910.05 73301.73 75994.37 84945.8
49 205361 200158.8 121025.8 104124.1 84335.15 96034.71
50 331680.3 322610.9 224126.2 195880.8 107554.1 126730.1
Note: This table shows the averages of owner's income, wage and dividends acquired
from the company in each income quantile (over 41).
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Table 9: Dividend means in 60 dividend quantiles
Quantile 2011 2012
47 29221.54 28400.61
48 31146.17 30289.43
49 33803.23 33045.90
50 37107.26 36215.04
51 40464.00 39788.00
52 45047.79 43510.74
53 49982.29 48629.79
54 56955.84 53786.03
55 64419.95 59743.84
56 74246.35 62488.69
57 87558.23 71747.37
58 97792.66 87138.75
59 127255.20 110725.00
60 197818.20 175591.00
Note: This table shows the average dividends in dividend quantiles (over 47).
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Figure 18: Placebo diﬀerences in real investment in dividend quantiles
Note: These graphs show that the yearly variation in net investment is notable. There-
fore, you cannot draw conclusions about the increase in diﬀerences in ﬁgure 15. Between
the dashed lines are the quantiles that face an increase in dividend taxation in 2012, as
in ﬁgure 15.
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Figure 19: Diﬀerence in net real investment in 2011-2012
Note: This ﬁgure shows the average changes in net real investment in income quantiles.
The red lines indicate the quantiles at which the income exceed ¿60,000 and ¿90,000
and the blue lines indicate the quantiles at which the average dividends exceed ¿60,000
and ¿90,000. The black solid line is the diﬀerence after the reform. It does not occur
very diﬀerent compared to the diﬀerences in the previous years, except for the highest
quantiles, where the increase is higher.
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Figure 20: Diﬀerence in ﬁnancial assets in 2011-2012
Note: This ﬁgure shows the average changes in ﬁnancial assets in income quantiles. The
dashed lines indicate the quantiles at which the dividends exceed ¿60,000 and ¿90,000.
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Figure 21: Shares of industries in dividend bins around the kink
Note: This ﬁgure shows the shares of some industries in dividend bins around the kink.
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